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OFF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MAP: BREAKING THE
ENDLESS CYCLE OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
School finance litigation has been caught in a never-ending
cycle in the United States. At the root of the problem is
legislative inaction and judicial withdrawal. A few courts have
chosen to stay involved, however—even to the point of holding
uncooperative legislatures in contempt or shutting down schools
entirely. This Comment examines three states that have been
hotbeds for this type of litigation and pushed the perceived
boundaries of their constitutional powers. It advocates for a
new approach for courts embroiled in a school funding
battle. While this approach is unprecedented, this Comment
argues it is both constitutional and effective. This is done by
way of comparison to similar separation of powers battles, such
as those during the prison reform and Civil Rights movements.
I.

INTRODUCTION

One function of the court system is to provide finality to the
parties and to resolve, once and for all, the dispute at hand.1
This doctrine saves the judiciary time and resources by
ensuring the same issues are not rehashed again and again. It
gives the parties a sense of resolution. It also promotes
fairness, continuity, and predictability in the legal system. This
doctrine manifests itself in multiple ways throughout the law:
res judicata, claim preclusion, double jeopardy, and stare
decisis, to name a few.
School finance litigation is one area where finality has been
incredibly elusive.2 Litigants in these suits seek to remedy the
perceived inadequacies or inequalities in public school funding,
1
See James Duke Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions,
and a Proposal for a National Court of Appeals—A State Judge’s Solution to a
Continuing Problem, 1981 BYU L. REV. 545, 556 (1981) (“Without finality, justice is a
myth.”); Brandon R. Christian, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Understanding Judicial
Doctrines of Finality, 85 FLA. BAR J. 32, 32 (2011), available at
http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/68F14BA4C5C82DD78525
78810069CAEE.
2
See infra Part II.B.
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which has been a difficult problem to solve. While this difficulty
is due to a complex number of problems, a major root of the
problem is legislative inaction.3 This, in turn, has led some
courts to relinquish their involvement in any new school
finance cases.4 Ultimately, this means no one is fighting for
children’s right to equal or adequate education in those states,
which is a troublesome notion and sure to have negative effects
years into the future.
A few courts, however, have chosen to fight back—even to
the point of holding the legislature in contempt for failing to
comply with their orders, or shutting down schools entirely.5
This Comment examines three states that have not only been
hotbeds for this type of litigation, but whose courts have
decided to deal with these suits by pushing the perceived
boundaries of their constitutional powers. As these states
realized, stern and novel judicial approaches, such as holding
noncompliant branches in contempt, are an unfortunate
necessity in these situations.
This Comment advocates for a new approach for courts
embroiled in a school funding battle. Part II provides a broad
overview of school finance litigation in the United States. Part
III then proceeds with a deeper look at three states in which
courts have clashed with legislatures in highly politicized and
controversial cases, and examines the separation of powers
issues in each. Part IV explores the different remedial trends in
school finance litigation and transitions into a recommendation
of which may be the most effective. This recommendation is
fully developed in Part V, which urges courts faced with
legislative inaction not to shirk their constitutional duty, as
many have now started to do. Courts can do this by imposing
contempt or other sanctions on legislatures that refuse to
cooperate. While this approach is relatively unprecedented, I
argue that contempt sanctions in these situations are both
constitutional and effective. This analysis is accomplished by
3
Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State Constitutional
Imperative, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 749–52 (2009) (“[L]egislative responses often d[o]
little to remedy the inequality . . . [P]laintiff victories rarely produce a systemic
overhaul of the school funding formulas. In part, that may be because legislators have
not always rushed to implement their court-imposed duty.”).
4
Id. at 761 (“Although a small number of state courts has [sic] long refused to
become embroiled in school funding debates, a new round of ‘judicial withdrawal’ is
emerging . . . .”).
5
See infra Part III.B–C.
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way of comparison to similar separation of powers battles, such
as those that took place during the Civil Rights movement.
II.

THE STATE OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION IN AMERICA

More than half a century has passed since the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, the
seminal case on education inequality in America.6 It recognized
and enforced the idea that “education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.”7 Yet, many
believed that inequality and inadequacy continued to exist in
schools after this ruling, and not just on racial grounds.8
Indeed, many continue to believe this problem still exists
today.9 Courts have, at times, agreed, and applied the Brown
ruling to other types of educational inequality cases since the
1950s.10 This part will explore the broad historical background
of school funding cases in the United States.
A.

What is School Finance Litigation?

School finance lawsuits seek to redress this perceived
inadequacy or inequality in the way states fund public schools
or public school districts.11 Funding for local education comes
from a variety of sources: the federal government, state
governments, and local public and private donors.12 Because of
this, the resources available to any given student can vary
greatly from state to state and across the country.13 Due to
reliance on local levies and property taxes, low-income districts
who cannot afford the extra property taxes perpetually
underfund their schools; higher-income districts can not only
adequately support their schools, but use the extra money to
offer an abundance of resources as well.14 Even the low-income
districts that choose to tax themselves at or above the rates of
6

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
8
National Education Access Network, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK,
http://schoolfunding.info/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
9
Id.
10
1-5 EDUCATION LAW § 5.01 (1984) {hereinafter EDUCATION LAW].
11
See Michael Griffin, School Finance Litigation and Beyond, EDUC. COMM’N OF
THE STATES (April 2005), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/60/26/6026.htm.
12
EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10, § 5.01.
13
Id.
14
Reynolds, supra note 3, at 752.
7
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comparable wealthy districts do not produce as much funding
for schools because of low property values.15
B.

Early School Finance Case Law

School funding cases technically got their start in 1819,16
with Commonwealth v. Inhabitants of Dedham.17 In that case,
Massachusetts sued the people of Dedham when they did not
comply with a state law requiring each town to employ a
sufficiently qualified teacher for every twenty households.18 The
town employed qualified teachers in some schools, but not all.19
The court reasoned that this law was in place to “give all the
inhabitants equal privileges, for the education of their children
in the public schools,” and that “it is not competent for a town
to establish a grammar school for the benefit of one part of the
town, to the exclusion of the other; although the money raised
for the support of schools may be, in other respects, fairly
apportioned.”20
While the state commenced the litigation process against its
residents in Dedham, the party roles have reversed in the
present day. Now, plaintiffs are typically students, parents,
and school districts, while defendants tend to be the state. That
was indeed what transpired in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, the next significant case in the
history of school finance litigation.21 The plaintiffs came from
Texas school districts with large minority and low-income
populations.22 The state school funding formula relied on local
property taxes.23 This funding structure resulted in the
plaintiffs’ lower-income district being able to spend $356 per
student; they compared this with the highest-income district
that spent $594 per student.24 The plaintiffs challenged the
constitutional validity of this formula as it created unequal
expenditures between children across different districts,
15

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 75 (1973).
Litigation,
EDUC.
JUST.
http://www.educationjustice.org/litigation.html.
17
16 Mass. 141 (1819).
18
Id. at 144.
19
Id. at 145–46.
20
Id. at 146.
21
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
22
Id. at 4–5.
23
Id. at 10–11.
24
Id. at 12–13.
16

(2014),
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resulting in a lower quality education for the low-income
districts.25
The district court agreed with the Rodriguez plaintiffs and
found that the Equal Protection Clause mandated funding
equality in their schools.26 The Supreme Court reversed and
upheld the state’s funding formula.27 It found that the system
did not discriminate against a “definable category of ‘poor’
people” and that it did not result in an absolute deprivation of
education.28 Moreover, the Court determined that wealth is not
a suspect classification and used rational basis review to reach
its decision.29 According to the Court, holding otherwise would
violate basic separation of powers principles by “assuming a
legislative role . . . for which the Court lacks both authority and
competence.”30 It refused to create positive constitutional rights
for the sake of equal protection.31 Thus, in the eyes of the
Powell Court, education is not a fundamental right under the
federal Constitution.32 As Justice Marshall noted in his lengthy
dissent, school finance litigants must now look to the states for
remedies.33 This separation of powers dialogue that began in
Rodriguez has continued at the state level and sparked a
heated public debate between branches of government.
C.

Modern Theories in School Funding Litigation

State equal protection contests in the same vein as
Rodriguez have not been terribly successful.34 Much like the
plaintiffs in Rodriguez, proponents of school finance reform
claim that unequal distribution of funds across districts
violates the equal protection clause under their state
constitutions.35 School finance litigation was typically based on
25

Id. at 23.
Id. at 15–16.
27
Id. at 25.
28
Id.
29
Amanda Marra, Note, The Right to a Thorough and Efficient System of
Education Trumps the Power of the Appropriations Clause in New Jersey, 43 RUTGERS
L. J. 771, 778 (2013).
30
411 U.S. at 31
31
Id. at 33.
32
Id. at 35.
33
MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 2 (2009).
34
Aaron Y. Tang, Note, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for
School Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1204 (2011).
35
Id. at 1202.
26
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these equal protection arguments in the 1960s and 1970s.36 An
estimated fourteen states have seen plaintiff victories under
this theory.37 This may be because courts and parties struggle
to define “equity” when it comes to school funding, and because
some courts believe education is a purely legislative matter38—
another argument echoed from Rodriguez.39 One study
concluded that states with school funding decisions based on
the equity theory actually experience declines in educational
funding.40
A few plaintiffs have experienced victories under this
approach, Wyoming being one example.41 There, the state
requires that school funding be based exclusively on student
need and the cost of services; fully funded at the state and not
the local level; and completely independent of the property
wealth of its district constituents.42 The impact of this victory is
reflected in some studies. For example, the Education Law
Center’s annual report card on school funding shows that
Wyoming is one of only three states that pays its teachers as
much or more than comparable workers (Rhode Island and
New York are the other two states).43 The study also shows that
Wyoming has the highest per-pupil spending of any state, at
$17,397 per student—over two and half times what the lowestspending state spends on its pupils (Idaho, at $6,753 per
student).44
While equity arguments have led to limited success,
challenges based on the education clause in state constitutions
are a somewhat different story. As soon as litigants switched to
“adequacy” arguments under these clauses, plaintiffs started
seeing greater successes.45 All states have imposed upon
36
Ben Wieder, Texas Among 10 States Facing Lawsuits Over Education
Funding, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2013/
01/02/4d9a7cca-544d-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc_story.html.
37
Tang, supra note 34, at 1202.
38
Id. at 1203–06.
39
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973).
40
Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance, and
Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735, 1761 (1995).
41
Reynolds, supra note 3, at 787.
42
Id.
43
BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. L. CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL
REPORT
CARD
38
(3d
ed.
2014),
available
at
http://schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card_2014.pdf.
44
Id. at 11.
45
Tang, supra note 34, at 1206.
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themselves positive constitutional duties to maintain
education.46 All fifty state constitutions mandate a “common,”
“uniform,” “efficient,” or some other standard of a public school
system,47 and many even say that this is a democratic
imperative.48 Two state constitutions make education the
“paramount duty” of the state.49 Moreover, the most important
source of funding for public education has commonly come from
states.50 Adequacy suits argue that, under these state
constitution education clauses, the legislature has failed to
provide an adequate level of education for all students.51 One
source estimates that twenty-two out of thirty-three, or sixtyseven percent, of adequacy cases decided since 1989 have been
victories for the plaintiffs.52
Commentators suggest adequacy suits have likely been
more successful than equity suits because they stem from a
more definite part of a constitutional text and are not subject to
the same difficulty in defining “equity” in the education finance
concept.53 While adequacy arguments are sometimes made
alongside equity arguments, adequacy claims differ in that
they seek an absolute remedy instead of a relative one.54
One state where this success has been realized is New
Hampshire. Before fruitful school finance litigation took place
there, schools relied heavily on local contributions. State
contributions only totaled eight percent of funding at that
time.55 Low-income districts spent as little as eight thousand
dollars per student and higher-income districts spent more
than twenty thousand dollars per student.56 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court found that this funding formula
violated the state constitution, because the state had a duty to
provide an adequate education to all students under that

46

John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the
War? 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2356 n.13 (2004).
47
EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10.
48
Molly A. Hunter, State Constitution Education Clause Language, EDUC. L.
CTR. (Jan. 2011), http://pabarcrc.org/pdf/Molly%20Hunter%20Article.pdf.
49
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
50
EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10.
51
Tang, supra note 34, at 1206.
52
REBELL, supra note 33, at 15–29.
53
Tang, supra note 34, at 1202, 1207.
54
Id.
55
Reynolds, supra note 3, at 786.
56
Id.
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document, and that “[t]here is nothing fair or just about taxing
a home or other real estate in one town at four times the rate
that similar property is taxed in another town to fulfill the
same purpose of meeting the State’s educational duty.”57 The
court continued, “in order to deliver a constitutionally adequate
public education to all children, comparable funding must be
assured . . . .”58 Obviously, an argument about the inequity
resulting from a locally-based funding formula convinced the
court that the whole formula was inadequate—local control
was, to the court, an inadequate means of funding education,
and the state was required to play a bigger role.59
Since then, New Hampshire has been one of only three
states to increase education funding—by more than twenty
percent, no less—from 2007 to 2011, despite the troubled
economy (Illinois and North Dakota are the other two).60 The
Education Law Center, however, still gave the state an “F”
rating for 2014 because of how fairly it distributes funds across
districts, suggesting that spending more money does not
necessarily mean all students are getting access to it.61
Still, the adequacy arguments have been susceptible to the
contention that education is a public policy matter better suited
for the legislature than the courts. A majority of the courts that
have rejected adequacy cases did so on the grounds of
justiciability.62 One example is Illinois. The supreme court
there rejected an education finance claim because it would
“deprive the members of the general public of a voice in a
matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in
Illinois.”63
D.

Challenges Still Remaining

Despite the relative trend toward success in school finance
litigation, students overall are seeing little in the way of

57

Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1357–60 (1997).
Id.
59
Id. at 1353, 1360 (“We recognize that local control plays a valuable role in
public education; however, the State cannot use local control as a justification for
allowing the existence of educational services below the level of constitutional
adequacy.”).
60
BAKER ET AL., supra note 43, at 11.
61
Id. at 18.
62
REBELL, supra note 33, at 22–29.
63
Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996).
58
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positive change. Empirical analyses have shown that successful
litigation does not necessarily influence education spending in
states.64 In fact, one study found that successful litigation
actually decreases educational spending.65 Despite proof that
reliance on local revenues creates inadequacies and
inequalities, and even despite court victories acknowledging
this fact, local funding still accounts for 43.5 percent of
revenues for elementary and secondary education in the United
States.66 In addition, while the nation reached its highest-ever
high school graduation rate in 2012—at eighty percent—the
disparities between low-income and higher-income, minority
and non-minority, and city and suburban students are still
staggering.67 Also, the United States has fallen behind eleven
other countries for college graduation rates, perhaps indicative
of the long-term consequences of this problem.68
The recession has not helped, either. School funding faces a
big risk, and usually suffers during economic decline.69 School
funding cases implicitly assume that more money in schools
will cause educational successes to rise to an acceptable level.70
While this is a contentious issue, courts are starting to
understand the connection. As the Wyoming Supreme Court
opined, “[i]t is nothing more than an illusion to believe that the
extensive disparity in financial resources does not relate
directly to quality of education.”71 Instructively, the United
States Supreme Court also observed that “[i]t would be difficult
to believe that if the children . . . had a free choice, they would
choose to be educated in districts with fewer resources, and
hence with more antiquated plants, less experienced teachers,
and a less diversified curriculum.”72
Overall, court decisions on school finance matters have
64

Heise, supra note 40, at 1741.
Id. at 1761.
66
Percentage Distribution of Revenues for Public Elementary and Secondary
Education in the United States, By Source: 2008–2009, EDUC. FIN. STAT. CTR. (2009),
http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/graph_topic.asp?INDEX=4.
67
Lyndsey Layton, National High School Graduation Rates at Historic High,
But
Disparities
Still
Exist,
WASH.
POST
(April
28,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/high-school-graduation-rates-athistoric-high/2014/04/28/84eb0122-cee0-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html.
68
Id.
69
BAKER ET AL., supra note 43, at 11.
70
EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10.
71
Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980).
72
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 85 (1973).
65
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been issued in forty-four of the fifty states.73 The American
Civil Liberties Union has threatened to bring such a suit in
Nevada, one of the states that has not yet experienced a school
funding lawsuit, but it has not followed through at this time.74
Iowa, another state where no decisions on the topic have been
handed down, defended against its only school funding lawsuit
in 2002.75 However, the suit was dropped when the legislature
agreed to increase revenue for the complaining districts.76 In
August of 2014, fourteen school districts sued for underfunding
education in another no-decision state, Mississippi.77 The case
has grown to include twenty-one districts, which are
collectively demanding $230 million in funding.78 The state
attorney general is seeking a dismissal of the case, and
characterized the legislative inaction problem as one of the
seminal reasons.79
Court rulings in favor of plaintiffs are, of course, only the
first step towards remedying these problems. From the results
of the empirical analyses mentioned above, it appears that
something breaks down after a court victory to cause these
troubling outcomes. Some have hinted, and this Comment
argues, that legislative inaction or pushback is where the
progress towards proper educational funding breaks down.80 To
further this problem, courts have become exasperated with the
lack of real change in education funding and are giving up.81
With that, proponents of school finance reform now have not
73

National Education Access Network, supra note 8.
Andrew Doughman, Education Advocates Threaten Lawsuit Over Funding
Public Schools, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 1, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/
news/2013/may/01/education-advocates-threaten-lawsuit-over-public-s/.
75
Tim Anderson, Full Court Pressure: Recent Supreme Court Ruling In Kansas
Serves as a Reminder of the Judiciary’s Power to Shape State School Funding, CSG
MIDWEST (Apr. 2014), http://www.csgmidwest.org/policyresearch/0314schoolfinancelitigation.aspx.
76
Id.
77
The Associated Press, 14 School Districts Sue State for Underfunding
Mississippi Adequate Educational Program, GULF LIVE (Aug. 28, 2014, 10:41 AM),
http://blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press-news/2014/08/14_school_districts_sue_state.
html.
78
Jeff Amy, Hood Asks Judge to Throw Out School Funding Suit, HATTIESBURG
AMERICAN (Oct. 8, 2014, 12:41 AM), http://www.hattiesburgamerican.com/story/news/
education/2014/10/07/school-funding-lawsuit/16889603/.
79
Id. (“[Attorney General] Hood’s office wrote that even though a 2006 law says
Mississippi’s school aid formula must be fully funded, that guarantee has no power to
bind future legislatures.”).
80
Reynolds, supra note 3, at 742.
81
Id. at 761.
74
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one, but two hurdles to clear before they can make positive
change—a win in the courts and action in the legislature.
The current education finance litigation trend assumes that
courts can influence educational spending. Up until this point,
that assumption has not been entirely true.82 When a funding
provision is declared constitutionally inadequate or unequal,
there is the potential for disruption of school function, so courts
can delay the ruling’s effective date to give school officials or
the legislature time to fix whatever issues the court deems
necessary.83 This practice may contribute to legislative inaction
or pushback as well—give someone an inch and they take a
mile, as the saying goes. These challenges are particularly
prevalent in the cases discussed in the following section.
III. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION AND ITS POLITICAL
RAMIFICATIONS
This part examines and analyzes three states’ school
finance litigation stories. It focuses on each state’s
constitutional debate between its courts, legislature, executive,
and public opinion. This part also analyzes the actions that
courts took that may have contributed to their relative
successes or failures. First, courts in Ohio learned that
compromise in the face of negative public opinion resulted in
its having to exit the debate. Second, decades of school finance
litigation in New Jersey culminated in shutting down schools
and, to some, a satisfactory resolution. Finally, the Washington
judiciary attempted to combine the lessons learned in both of
the previous states in a still-ongoing battle with its legislature,
the full results of which are yet unseen.
A.

Ohio

The Ohio Supreme Court battled with legislators for
thirteen years over education finance in its most recent saga of
cases, DeRolph v. State.84 Within this time, four different
rulings all upheld students’ rights to adequately funded
82

Heise, supra note 40, at 1750.
EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10.
84
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) [DeRolph I]; DeRolph v. State,
728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) [DeRolph II]; DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio
2001) [DeRolph III]; DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) [DeRolph IV]; Tang,
supra note 34, at 1209–10.
83
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education.85 School finance litigation actually goes back as far
as 1923 in Ohio, when the state supreme court made its first
attempt at clarifying the education clause in the state
constitution.86 That provision states that the legislature “shall
make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the
income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout
the state.”87 The court in that early case found for the plaintiffs
(taxpayers and school districts who challenged unfair funding
distributions), a harbinger for what was to come almost
seventy years later.88
The court’s constitutional power to decide such cases was
secured in the interim. In Board of Education v. Walter,
plaintiffs challenged the Ohio financing scheme once again, but
this time made an equity argument.89 Like the equity cases
brought in other states, the Walter plaintiffs did not prevail.90
The majority looked to school finance decisions in New Jersey
and Washington, both discussed below, in determining that the
issue before the court was justiciable—not a political question
beyond its reach, as the defendant State argued.91
Then came the first of the DeRolph cases in 1991. Five
school districts throughout the state asked the court to declare
the public school finance system unconstitutional.92 The trial
court found a number of shocking inadequacies in schools. Just
seventeen percent of heating systems in these schools were
deemed “satisfactory,” and thirty-one percent of fire alarm
systems were deemed “adequate.”93 Almost seventy percent of
schools had failed to remove asbestos, directly violating an

85

Tang, supra note 34, at 1209–10.
See Miller v. Korns, 140 N.E. 773 (Ohio 1923).
87
OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
88
140 N.E. at 778–79 (opining that “a man who sends his children to private
educational institutions may be required to help support public schools for other
children, or that the man who has no children may be taxed to support schools for other
men’s families. It is no gratuity, no private gift to an individual, nor to a particular
district, to support the schools of the state. It is a contribution to the public, and not to
a local purpose; a contribution to the community’s very life, which must be exacted of
every citizen.”).
89
390 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ohio 1979).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 824.
92
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ohio 1997).
93
Id. at 742.
86
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Environmental Protection Agency mandate.94 One school
building was sliding down a hill an inch per month.95 At
another school, students were “subjected to breathing coal dust
which [was] emitted into the air and actually cover[ed] the
students’ desks after accumulating overnight.”96 “Obviously,”
the court observed, “state funding of school districts cannot be
considered adequate . . . .”97
Despite these findings, the Ohio Supreme Court only struck
down the school finance system by a slim four-to-three
majority.98 The dissent thought school funding questions were
nonjusticiable political questions.99 This disagreement among
the justices touched off the constitutional battle that would
continue between the majority and the Ohio legislature for
years. Perhaps to appease the dissent, the court did not require
the legislature to take any specific action, but did ask the
legislature to create a new finance system and allowed the trial
court to retain jurisdiction until it was satisfied.100 Based on a
survey the legislature itself conducted, the court stated that
ten billion dollars was necessary to bring funding to
constitutional levels.101
The legislature struggled to comply with the court’s order.
Some lawmakers did not question the court’s constitutional
authority to force compliance on the issue, while others
Ultraconservative
legislators
expressed
reservations.102
suggested stripping the court of jurisdiction or amending the
constitution.103 Some even advocated impeaching the justices
who made up the majority.104 The media made similar
recommendations, and urged the legislature to ignore the
court’s orders.105 In the wake of the court’s decision, the
legislature appropriated an additional three hundred million
94

Id. at 743.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 744.
98
Id. at 735.
99
Id. at 782.
100
Id. at 747.
101
Id. at 742, 780.
102
Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate
Education, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 111–12 (2005), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1198&context=elj.
103
Id. at 112. See also Tang, supra note 34, at 1209–10.
104
Tang, supra note 34, at 1209–10.
105
Obhof, supra note 102, at 111.
95
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dollars for improvements, just three percent of the amount the
legislature’s survey required.106 The governor passed a bill
purporting to change the school funding formula, but no
substantive changes were truly made.107 The legislature offered
up the issue to a vote, as a sales tax increase.108 This also
failed.109
As expected, the issue again rose to the Ohio Supreme
Court a few years later.110 The same majority-dissent
breakdown
found
the
then-current
funding
scheme
unconstitutional, but acknowledged that progress had been
made.111 It also acknowledged the separation of powers issue,
and reasoned that it had been deliberately conservative in
allowing the legislature to define the legislation’s
parameters.112 The court also upheld its authority to enforce its
own orders; otherwise, the “power to find a particular act
unconstitutional would be a nullity.”113 If a remedy is never
enforced, it is not actually a remedy, the court opined.114
Although the second DeRolph decision mainly echoed the
first, legislative and public opinion was no longer as mixed.
Many legislators, the governor, and commentators all
disagreed with the holding.115 The author of the majority
opinion managed to win re-election the next year despite a
vocal and well-funded campaign to unseat her, with many
attacks made specifically about the education decision.116 The
legislature managed to appropriate another one billion dollars
to school construction, again falling short of the original ten
106

Id. at 114.
Anne M. Hayes, Tension in the Judicial-Legislative Relationship: DeRolph v.
State, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 611, 637 (2001) (“Changes made to the school funding system
under H.B. 650 were a tweaking of the existing system. There were no substantive
changes made to the funding system or the formula for disbursing state basic aid.”).
108
Kerry A. White, Ohio Voters Reject Sales-Tax Hike for Schools, EDUC. WEEK,
May
13,
1998,
at
17,
available
at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1998/05/13/35ohio.h17.html.
109
Id.
110
DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000).
111
Id. at 1003 (“There are indications that Governor Taft and the General
Assembly have taken some of the steps necessary to remedy a situation that has been
neglected for more than twenty–five years.”).
112
Id. at 1002–03.
113
Id. at 1003.
114
Id.
115
Obhof, supra note 102, at 125–26.
116
Spencer Hunt, Anti-Resnick Ad Pulled, Replaced, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct.
25, 2000), http://enquirer.com/editions/2000/10/25/loc_anti-resnick_ad.html.
107
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billion dollar order, which likely was much larger by that
time.117 At that point, the court contemplated holding the
legislature in contempt.118 One of the justices, part of the
original majority that struck down the Ohio funding plan,
publicly commented that a contempt order was one of the
possible routes, and that the court does ‘“have some power to do
things when groups or individuals do not comply with our
orders.’”119 The justice went on to explain that jail terms or
fines could result, but did not outline how those penalties
would work for an entire legislature.120
With that, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the issue a
third time in 2001.121 The plaintiffs suggested the court go the
contempt route mentioned previously, along with a number of
other controversial remedies.122 Again, the court found the
legislature to be noncompliant, but hedged this by
relinquishing its jurisdiction over the matter.123 Justices and
commentators observed that this decision constituted a
compromise between members of the court to end its
involvement.124
The court did, however, take a controversial step in
DeRolph III by ordering the legislature to make specific
modifications to school funding.125 Many, including some of the
original majority members, found this to be a grave breach of
constitutional boundaries.126 The state also felt this was
improper judicial lawmaking and asked the court to
reconsider.127 Further, the plaintiffs were unhappy with the
decision as well, feeling it was a retreat from the previous

117

See Obhof, supra note 102, at 131.
James Drew, Contempt-of-Court Threat Hangs Over School-Funding Case,
TOLEDO BLADE (June 10, 2001), http://www.toledoblade.com/State/2001/06/10/
Contempt-of-court-threat-hangs-over-school-funding-case.html; Spencer Hunt & Travis
James Tritten, Resnick Explores Enforcing Directive, ENQUIRER (April 6, 2001),
http://enquirer.com/editions/2001/04/06/loc_resnick_explores.html.
119
Drew, supra note 118; Hunt & Tritten, supra note 118.
120
Hunt & Tritten, supra note 118.
121
See DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001).
122
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 48, DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio
2001)
(No.
99-0570),
available
at
http://www.bricker.com/documents/resources/schoolfund/scderolph518.pdf.
123
754 N.E.2d at 1190.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 1200–01.
126
Id. at 1239–45.
127
DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 535 (Ohio 2002).
118

4.Davis.PubEdit.117-159 - Proof 2.docx (Do Not Delete)

132

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

3/22/16 11:53 AM

[2016

decisions.128 The Ohio Supreme Court agreed one last time to
hear the case. The original majority came together to vacate
DeRolph III, reinstate DeRolph II, find the funding levels
unconstitutional yet again, but relinquish jurisdiction for
good.129
The Ohio Supreme Court did what many other courts have
done. It gave up and acquiesced to chronic legislative failure.130
While it had the opportunity to take lasting measures in
DeRolph III, it decided to err on the side of compromise, which
allowed the problem to continue. Compromise is a hallmark of
the legislative branch. The judiciary, on the other hand, is
supposed to take the minority position where warranted,
despite the potential unpopularity or uncertainty this may
cause. Interestingly, DeRolph was the first education finance
case in the state to attempt adequacy arguments.131 While that
may have helped secure the plaintiffs’ victory, that step
forward undoubtedly did not result in constitutionallymandated funding. Scholars have observed that, despite the
“culmination” of the DeRolph cases, the fight for adequate
school funding in Ohio never truly ended.132 After thirteen
years, the court may have simply fallen victim to “battle
fatigue.”133
B.

New Jersey

If Ohio’s struggle seems exhausting, New Jersey endured
the legal equivalent of the Thirty Years’ War. That state
endured two distinct sets of long-lasting school finance
litigation. The first was Robinson v. Cahill, which spanned
seven different New Jersey Supreme Court opinions within
three years.134 Students and others sued state officials, arguing
that the state relied on a funding system that discriminated
against low-income districts and imposed unequal burdens on
128

Obhof, supra note 102, at 135–36.
780 N.E.2d at 530.
130
Tang, supra note 34, at 1209–10.
131
Obhof, supra note 102, at 84.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 140.
134
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) [Robinson I]; Robinson v. Cahill,
306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973) [Robinson II]; Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975)
[Robinson III]; Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1975) [Robinson IV]; Robinson v.
Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) [Robinson V]; Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J.
1976) [Robinson VI]; Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) [Robinson VII].
129
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taxpayers.135 This was an equity claim, similar to that raised in
Ohio. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected it.136 The court
still found the funding scheme unconstitutional under the state
education clause, however.137 That clause provides, “[t]he
Legislatures shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the
instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of
five and eighteen years.”138 The court issued a second opinion
soon thereafter, extending the deadline for the legislature to
reach an agreement.139
Even with the extended deadline, the other branches of
New Jersey’s government struggled to comply with the court’s
ruling. The governor drew up a plan to change the school
funding formula, part of which introduced a state income tax,140
but his bill did not pass.141 The governor asked the state
supreme court for relief and, in a third ruling, the court agreed
to hear the case at a later date.142 In that fourth ruling, the
court devised a remedy that would be put in place if the
legislature could not come up with its own by the next school
year.143 With only two days to spare, the legislature passed a
law that increased funding to low-income school districts, and
the state supreme court upheld the remedy as constitutional in
its fifth decision of the case.144
The New Jersey legislature did not follow through with the
act it created.145 It failed to actually appropriate any money
under the new law.146 With this overt legislative failure, the
court took drastic action. In a sixth ruling, it enjoined the
legislature from spending any money on public schools unless it
funded the act it had created or found some new way to

135

Robinson I, supra note 134, at 276.
Id. at 283.
137
Id. at 298.
138
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV.
139
Robinson II, supra note 134, at 66.
140
Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s
Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615, 619
(2004).
141
Id.
142
Robinson III, supra note 134, at 7.
143
Robinson IV, supra note 134, at 198.
144
Robinson V, supra note 134, at 129.
145
Greif, supra note 140, at 620.
146
Id.
136
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appropriate funds under the constitution.147 The legislature did
nothing.148 In response, the court shut down schools for eight
days because of the legislature’s failure to comply.149 The
legislature then decided to act. It came together to approve a
state income tax, which would fund the act it created.150 In the
seventh and final ruling of the Robinson saga, the state
supreme court withdrew the injunction and schools reopened.151
As mentioned earlier, though, this did not end school finance
litigation in New Jersey.
Next came Abbott v. Burke, a line of cases that lasted
twenty-four years and resulted in more than twenty opinions
by the state’s courts.152 The case started in 1981, when the
Education Law Center challenged the state’s public education
funding scheme.153 The first ruling from the state supreme
court came four years later, when the court transferred the
case to an administrative law judge.154 That judge held the
school funding law unconstitutional with respect to twentyeight low-income, urban school districts in the state.155 The
state supreme court upheld this finding when it was challenged
in the second Abbott decision.156
Thereafter, the legislature and supreme court engaged in
extensive back and forth litigation, with the legislature
proposing funding schemes and the supreme court rejecting
them.157 Finally, in its twentieth decision on the case, the court
147

Robinson VI, supra note 134, at 459.
Greif, supra note 140, at 620.
149
History of Funding Equity, STATE OF N.J, DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www.state.nj.us/education/archive/abbotts/chrono/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
150
Greif, supra note 140, at 620.
151
Robinson VII, supra note 134, at 400 (N.J. 1976).
152
Tang, supra note 34, at 1209.
153
The History of Abbott v. Burke, EDUC. L. CTR., http://www.edlawcenter.org/
cases/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
154
Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 393 (N.J. 1985) [Abbott I].
155
The History of Abbott v. Burke, supra note 153. Despite a more official
designation as “SDA Districts” (Schools Development Authority), these districts have
become known as “Abbott districts,” which is now a common phrase in New Jersey
news and politics. See Matt Friedman, Sweeney Suggests Making Atlantic City an
Abbott District, THE STAR-LEDGER, (July 23, 2014), http://www.nj.com/politics/
index.ssf/2014/07/sweeney_suggests_making_atlantic_city_an_abbott_district.html.
The colloquialism even has its own Wikipedia page. Abbott District, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbott_district (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
156
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 383 (N.J. 1990) [Abbott II].
157
The History of Abbott v. Burke, supra note 153. See also Abbott v. Burke, 643
A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) [Abbott III]; Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) [Abbott
IV]; Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998) [Abbott V]; Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82
148
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was satisfied.158 It found the new legislative formula,
designated the “School Funding Reform Act” (SFRA), to be
constitutional.159 When the 2010 legislature then adopted
Governor Chris Christie’s $1.1 billion cuts to the SFRA,
however, the court again ordered the legislature to fully fund
its proposal.160
Surely, the need for finality is no greater anywhere else
than here. New Jersey withstood almost three decades of nonstop school finance litigation. Even if some feel that the Abbott
litigation was ultimately successful, other states contemplating
solutions to school finance disagreements would surely object to
undertaking an expensive, exhausting, decades-long argument
with the legislature to reach that ultimate goal. New Jersey
took the long road to reach a resolution; judicial resources can
likely be used more efficiently to solve such problems. Still, it
must be acknowledged that a resolution was reached. When the
court acted on its orders and shut down schools, the legislature
came together to find a solution.
C.

Washington

The Washington judiciary had no interest in replicating
New Jersey’s school finance quagmire. Beginning with Seattle
School District v. State, the state supreme court held that
schools’ forced reliance on local levies for funding was
unconstitutional and required the legislature to shoulder the
burden for education funding, as per the state constitution.161
That document states, “It is the paramount duty of the state to
make ample provision for the education of all children residing

(N.J. 2000) [Abbott VI]; Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000) [Abbott VII];
Abbott v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842 (N.J. 2002) [Abbott VIII]; Abbott v. Burke, 798 A.2d 602
(N.J. 2002) [Abbott IX]; Abbott v. Burke, 832 A.2d 891 (N.J. 2003) [Abbott X]; Abbott v.
Burke, 832 A.2d 906 (N.J. 2003) [Abbott XI]; Abbott v. Burke, 852 A.2d 185 (N.J. 2004)
[Abbott XII]; Abbott v. Burke, 862 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2004) [Abbott XIII]; Abbott v. Burke,
889 A.2d 1063 (N.J. 2005) [Abbott XIV]; Abbott v. Burke, 901 A.2d 299 (N.J. 2006)
[Abbott XV]; Abbott v. Burke, 1 A.3d 602 (N.J. 2006) [Abbott XVI]; Abbott v. Burke,
935 A.2d 1152 (N.J. 2007) [Abbott XVII]; Abbott v. Burke, 956 A.2d 923 (2008) [Abbott
XVIII]; Abbott v. Burke, 960 A.2d 360 (2008) [Abbott XIX].
158
Jessica Corbett, Thorough and Efficient Education: An Act Ending WealthBased School Funding in New Jersey is Constitutional, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1027, 1027–28
(2010).
159
Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 992 (N.J. 2009) [Abbott XX].
160
The History of Abbott v. Burke, supra note 153.
161
90 Wash. 2d 476, 483–86 (1978).
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within its borders . . . .”162 The court found this clause unique
amongst other state constitution education clauses, requiring
that education funding be the legislature’s foremost concern.163
The court also found that the state’s “duty goes beyond
mere reading, writing and arithmetic.”164 “Ample provision”
meant that the state must provide opportunities to ready
children for their role as citizens and competitors in the job
market.165 Despite these strong edicts, the court did not retain
jurisdiction over the case, trusting that the legislature would
comply.166 One justice dissented, finding the legislative
“ultimatums” inappropriate for separation of powers reasons.167
The majority ruling, however, just resulted in further litigation
of the same issue thirty-four years later.
The Seattle School District court’s deference to the
Washington legislature ultimately led to McCleary v. State in
2012.168 The majority opinion echoed many of the sentiments
from its precursor case.169 The state supreme court again found
that the legislature was underfunding state schools.170 It held
that the words “ample provision” required more than just
minimum levels of funding, and “paramount duty” meant
education comes before all else.171 This time, however, the court
decided it would not be fooled twice, and retained jurisdiction
over the case.172 Two justices concurred in part with the finding
of a constitutional violation, but dissented in part over the
retained jurisdiction.173 Overall, though, public opinion seemed
largely in favor of the court’s ruling.174
162

WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
90 Wash. 2d at 498–500 (“The duty to make ‘ample provision’, as opposed to
merely providing for a ‘general and uniform’ school system, is the only instance in
which our constitution declares a specific state function to be a ‘paramount duty’ of the
State.”).
164
Id. at 517.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 484 (“We do not retain jurisdiction over the parties or the action being
confident the Legislature will comply fully with its constitutionally mandated duty.”).
167
Id. at 579 (Rossellini, J., dissenting).
168
173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 484.
171
Id. at 515–20.
172
Id. at 484.
173
Id. at 547–50.
174
See Peter Callaghan, State’s McCleary Report Skips the Hard Questions, The
BELLINGHAM
HERALD
(Sep.
5,
2013),
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/
2013/09/05/3185915/states-mccleary-report-skips-the.html;
Editorial
Board,
163
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Retaining jurisdiction meant the legislature was required to
provide the court with ongoing progress reports.175 The court
still “deferred to the legislature’s chosen means of discharging
its constitutional duty,” but vowed that it would hold the
legislature to any reforms it decided to adopt.176 State officials
estimated they would need at least four billion dollars to make
up their deficit.177 In its third report, though, the legislature
candidly admitted that it had stopped making progress towards
the “program of basic education as directed by the Court.”178
Because the legislature failed to implement its own plan to
increase funding to appropriate levels, the McCleary plaintiffs
asked the court to do something in response.179 At this point,
the legislature seemed to go on the defensive. As one journalist
wrote, legislators began issuing “[a]mateur treatises on
separation of powers and condescending reports explaining . . .
how the budget works . . . . Oh, and snarky tweets about
pounding sand.”180 The writer continued, likely echoing public
sentiment: “[Q]uit whining. No one cares.”181
In response to all of this, the court did do something. It
issued a unanimous “show cause” order to the legislature,
asking it to explain why it should not be held in contempt for

Washington State Must Embrace a New Vision for Education, THE SEATTLE TIMES
(Sep. 8, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/editorialsopinionpages/
2019095920_washingtonstatemustembraceanewvisionforeducation.html. But see, Brian
M. Rosenthal, Conservatives Cry “Activism” After Losing Pair of Major Court Cases,
THE
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Mar.
23,
2013,
7:00
PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020628808_supremecourtxml.html.
175
Order, McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012) (No. 84362-7), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/PublicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/843627%20order%20-%209-11-2014.pdf.
176
Order to Show Cause, McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012) (No. 843627),
available
at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/supreme%
20Court%20News/84362-7_McCleary_ShowCauseOrder_201406124.pdf.
177
John Stang, Blurred Lines In Olympia: Is It Time to Start Arguing About the
2015 Budget? CROSSCUT (Dec. 18, 2013), http://crosscut.com/2013/12/18/politicsgovernment/117966/inslee-budget-governor/.
178
Order, McCleary v. State, supra note 175.
179
Plaintiff/Respondents’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at 47, McCleary v. State, 173
Wash. 2d 477 (2012)(No. 84362-7), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7Plaintiff-Respondents2013_PostBudget
Filing.pdf.
180
Peter Callaghan, What Contempt for the Legislature Might Look Like, THE
NEWS TRIBUNE (May 29, 2014), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicupload/
eclips/2014%2005%2029%20Peter%20Callaghan%20What%20contempt%20for%20the
%20Legislature%20might%20look%20like.pdf.
181
Id.

4.Davis.PubEdit.117-159 - Proof 2.docx (Do Not Delete)

138

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

3/22/16 11:53 AM

[2016

violating a court order.182 At the plaintiffs’ urging, the court
asked the legislature to ponder ordering the sale of state
property to fund compliance, invalidating education funding
cuts, or prohibiting any funding of education at all (which
would mean shutting down schools, reminiscent of Robinson v.
Cahill).183 A very controversial and public debate ensued until
the time of the hearing. Opposing editorials poured into
newspapers across the state,184 as many recognized the court
was entering “uncharted waters.”185
In its briefs, the legislature asked the court not to impose
sanctions. “[W]e have found no case where any state’s highest
court issued or affirmed contempt sanctions against that state’s
own legislature. All of the cases Plaintiffs cite are federal cases
and none involve[] a state legislature or implicate[] separation
of powers . . . .”186 The legislature simply said that it needed
more time for its warring factions to come to an agreement.187 A
contempt order, it assured, was not necessary to get its
attention.188
This assurance, however, did not sway the court and what
happened next was unprecedented.189 After finding the

182
183

Order to Show Cause, McCleary v. State, supra note 176.
Id.; Plaintiff/Respondents’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing, McCleary v. State, supra

note 179.
184
Lauren Drake, Local Lawmakers Split on Supreme Court’s Role in Education
Funding, THE COLUMBIAN, Sep. 3, 2014, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
content/publicupload/eclips/2014%2009%2005%20Local%20lawmakers%20split%20on
%20Supreme%20Courts%20role%20in%20education%20funding.pdf; Editorial Board,
State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, UNION BULLETIN (Aug. 29,
2014),
http://union-bulletin.com/news/2014/aug/31/state-ags-refresher-separationpowers-welcome/; Chris Gregoire and John Spellman, Guest: Supreme Court Should
Tread Carefully With Legislature Threats in McCleary Education Case, SEATTLE TIMES
(Sep.
1,
2014,
5:13
PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2024422197_
chrisgregoirejohnspellmanopedmccleary02xml.html.
185
Daniel Jack Chasan, How Far Will the State Supreme Court Go on McCleary?
CROSSCUT
(Feb.
5,
2015),
http://crosscut.com/2015/02/05/community-idealab/123704/how-do-you-solve-problem-mccleary/.
186
State of Washington’s Reply at 15, McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012)
(No.
84362-7),
available
at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/
Supreme%20Court%20News/843627_StateOfWashingtonsReply.pdf.
187
State of Washington’s Opening Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause at 1–2,
McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012) (No. 84362-7), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/supreme%20Court%20News/843627_McCleary_OpeningBrief_20140711.pdf.
188
Order, McCleary v. State, supra note 175.
189
Washington State Supreme Court, Oral Arguments: McCleary, et al. v. State
of
Washington,
TVW.ORG,
at
24:00
(Sep.
3,
2014),
http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2014090001.
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legislature’s reasons unpersuasive, the court did what the Ohio
Supreme Court had previously threatened to do: It held the
entire state legislature in contempt.190 Despite the court’s prior
lack of agreement about how to proceed with the case, the
decision was unanimous.191 The question of sanctions that it
posed to both sides remained unanswered at that time.192 “[I]n
the interest of comity,” the court gave the legislature time to
purge its contempt.193 If no agreement was reached by the end
of the 2015 legislative session, the court stated it would
reconvene to decide on sanctions or other remedies.194
By this time, public opinion ranged from relief that the
court decided to defer,195 to feeling that the court was “out of
control.”196 This latter sentiment must have waned a bit,
however. Two months later, a referendum requiring the
legislature to “allocate funds to reduce class sizes and increase
staffing support”197 passed, albeit by less than two percent.198
The referendum was commonly referenced alongside the
McCleary case.199 While this may have put more pressure on
legislators to act according to the court’s order, some argued
this will actually make it harder to fund the McCleary order
190

Order, McCleary v. State, supra note 175.
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Editorial Board, Editorial: State Supreme Court’s Contempt Ruling Makes
Point on Education, Not Obstacles, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Sep. 11, 2014, 4:49 PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/editorials/2024517832_mcclearyeditxml.html;
Editorial
Board, Legislature Correctly Gets More Time for School Solution, THE YAKIMA HERALD,
Sep. 14, 2014, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicupload/eclips/2014%
2009%2015%20Legislature%20correctly%20gets%20more%20time%20for%20school%2
0solution.pdf.
196
Editorial Board, High Court’s Threat to Punish Legislature Goes Too Far,
UNION BULLETIN (Sep. 15, 2014), http://union-bulletin.com/news/2014/sep/15/highcourts-threat-punish-state-legislature-goes-t/. See also, Richard S. Davis, Court
Finesses Crisis It Created, THE HERALD (Sep. 17, 2014, 12:01 AM),
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20140917/OPINION04/140919187.
197
Liv Finne, Citizens’ Guide to Initiative 1351: To Reduce Class Sizes, WASH.
POL’Y CTR., Sep. 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/brief/
citizens-guide-initiative-1351-reduce-class-sizes.
198
November 4, 2014 General Election Results: Initiative Measure No. 1351
Concerns K–12 Education, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE ELECTIONS AND VOTING,
http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20141104/State-Measures-Initiative-Measure-No1351-Concerns-K-12-education.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
199
John Higgins, I-1351: Proposal Would Cut Class Sizes, Cost Billions, THE
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Oct.
11,
2014,
5:11
PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2024758146_electclasscostsxml.html.
191
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because the initiative funding must come from already existing
education budgets, instead of appropriating new money.200
As of this writing, the McCleary story continues to unfold.
In August of 2015, the Washington Supreme Court finally
decided to answer its open-ended question about sanctions and
imposed fines of $100,000 per day against the state.201 The fines
are held “for the benefit of basic education,” although questions
remain as to how the court will enforce the payment of those
fines.202
The Washington legislature seemed to be plagued by an
especially deep-seated form of resistance. While it seemed as if
it had made changes to the school finance laws at first, it never
actually placed itself under any statutory obligation to fully
fund education.203 The legislature’s “reforms” allowed it to
simply adjust its formula to account for short-term political
goals, while feigning compliance with the state constitution.204
The court clearly learned that the kind of deference it gave the
legislature in Seattle School District only allowed the problem
to arise again at a later date, and that lack of finality is
beneficial to no one. That kind of solution is simply a surface
bandage for an issue requiring deeper surgery. The contempt
citation, however, may prove effective. The State of
Washington has generally fallen below the national average in
education spending per student,205 and the question remains as
to whether the legislature will be able to change that and purge
its contempt by crafting a real, sustainable solution to the
problem.206

200

Finne, supra note 197.
Joseph O’Sullivan, School Funding Back on Table as Court Fines State
$100,000 A Day, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015, 10:51 AM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/supreme-court-orders-100000-perday-fines-in-mccleary-case/.
202
Id.
203
Daniel C. Stallings, Comment, Washington State’s Duty to Fund K–12
Schools: Where the Legislature Went Wrong and What It Should Do to Meet Its
Constitutional Obligation, 85 WASH. L. REV. 575, 593–94 (2010).
204
Id.
205
Id. at 575.
206
Kansas underwent a separation of powers struggle over school funding
strikingly similar to Washington’s. See REBELL, supra note 33, at 31; Richard E. Levy,
Gunfight at the K–12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School
Finance Litigation, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1021 (2006). Given the substantial overlap, I
decided not to include an analysis of the case.
201
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IV. IDENTIFYING THE ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS TO THE NEVERENDING CYCLE
This part proceeds in two main sections. First, it brings
together both the broad and specific school finance history
examined previously to identify the true issue behind
continued failures. While many factors can contribute to this
continued inadequacy in state schools, this part argues that
legislative inaction is the culprit and must be targeted. Second,
this part will compare the possible solutions to this issue,
transitioning into a discussion of which solutions may be the
most effective. Continued litigation, special masters, public
votes, and court-ordered sanctions are discussed as possible
solutions.
A.

The Issues

From an examination of these three representative states,
one can see the basic issue is legislative inaction.207 Despite
increasingly successful lawsuits, great strides are not being
made because legislatures rarely follow through and assign
additional new funding to schools.208 They are the only ones
that have the power to do so,209 so the burden falls fully on
them. Essentially, this renders courts ineffective. Their rulings
are no more than empty words if they never enforce their
mandates. Because of this perceived inability, a secondary
problem has arisen: many courts are giving up on the issue and
refusing to do anything.210
This judicial weariness is troublesome. Some courts have
rejected suits under the political question doctrine or other
justiciability grounds.211 Others have blatantly stopped
207
Reynolds, supra note 3, at 749–52 (“[L]egislative responses often d[o] little to
remedy the inequality . . . [P]laintiff victories rarely produce a systematic overhaul of
the school funding formulas. In part, that may be because legislators have not always
rushed to implement their court-imposed duty.”).
208
See supra Part III.
209
See Ronald Snell, The Power of the Purse: Legislatures that Write State
Budges Independently of the Governor, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (March 2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/the-power-of-the-purse-legislatures-thatwrite-st.aspx (“All state constitutions require that the state legislature enact
appropriations in order for money to be spent from the treasury.”).
210
Reynolds, supra note 3, at 761 (“Although a small number of state courts has
long refused to become embroiled in school funding debates, a new round of ‘judicial
withdrawal’ is emerging . . . .”).
211
Tang, supra note 34, at 1208.
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trying.212 This problem is likely exacerbated in states where
judges face election. School funding cases like those in Ohio,
New Jersey, and Washington are highly controversial, highly
politicized, and garner lots of media attention. Judges striving
for re-election do not want to be the target of scathing op-eds
and radio or television commercials if they want to keep their
jobs. It is a difficult position in which to find oneself. Those
judges cannot continue to protect rights if they lose their
positions to candidates unsympathetic to school finance
plaintiffs. Venturing off the well-trodden constitutional path to
protect those rights could result in undesirable, very public
backlash.
Along those same lines, voters will not necessarily step into
the fray either. While Washington’s vote was more or less
successful, the referendum in Ohio to bolster its supreme court
ruling failed.213 The latter result is predictable and
understandable; raising taxes, for however noble a cause, is
rarely a popular idea.214 Even at the local level, school levies
are notorious failures, which is what prompts many school
finance litigation cases at the outset.215 Clearly, part of the
problem cannot also be a solution. Where the facts and the law
warrant, the most vital role of the judiciary is to protect the
unpopular, but absolutely necessary, civil rights of the
minority.216
All of this ultimately means that students across the
country continue to underachieve despite successful rulings
and reforms.217 Moreover, court decisions in some states are
actually associated with subsequent declines in educational
funding, suggesting a serious lack of judicial efficacy.218 So,
what can a court do when faced with a recalcitrant legislature
and unconstitutionally inadequate levels of education funding?
212

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Parts III.A, III.C.
214
See Fewer Want Spending to Grow, But Most Cuts Remain Unpopular, PEW
RES. CTR. (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.people-press.org/2011/02/10/fewerwant-spending-to-grow-but-most-cuts-remain-unpopular/.
215
Reynolds, supra note 3, at 751–52. See, e.g., Terra Goodnight, All Ten School
Levies for New Operating Funds Fail, INNOVATION OHIO (Aug. 7, 2013),
http://innovationohio.org/2013/08/07/all-ten-school-levies-for-new-operating-funds-fail/
(“Typically 35% of requests for additional funds succeed.”).
216
Terrance Sandlow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162,
1164 (1977). See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
217
Heise, supra note 40, at 1741.
218
Id. at 1761.
213
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The Solutions

1. Further litigation
One possible solution is to simply continue allowing
plaintiffs to bring school funding cases to the courts, and
continuing to rule in their favor. Proponents of judicial
deference and conservatism argue this is, in fact, all that a
court can do. Separation of powers and consideration for a coequal branch of government require that a court not exercise
the legislature’s “power of the purse.” This, however, is a
massive waste of judicial time and resources. New Jersey,
discussed above, is a prime example. While this is the “safe”
option, unlikely to cause any constitutional conflicts, it can be
exhausting and eventually unfruitful. It encourages quick fixes
to the problem instead of a deeper overhaul of faulty systems.
Further, there are ways to appropriately use judicial power
without interfering with the legislature’s power of the purse.
Most importantly, this solution directly violates that important
principal of finality revered throughout the legal system.
2. Special masters
Some have advocated for appointing a special master to
handle the specifics of school funding cases,219 and courts have
certainly used them for this purpose in the past.220 Special
masters are appointed by courts to manage aspects of a case,
typically when they are very complex or fact-heavy. Both
parties must consent to the appointment of a special master.221
Special masters cannot make any binding budget changes or
force the legislature to comply in any way, however.222 They
typically just conduct research, make findings of fact, or
oversee proceedings.223 Even if they were to outline a proposal
for increasing school funding, the legislature has likely heard
plenty of “proposals.” It is agreeing on one that is the problem.
Unfortunately, special masters are by no means enforcement
219
Lisa MacFarlane, Court Should Appoint a K–12 “Special Master”, THE
OLYMPIAN (Sep. 14, 2014), http://www.theolympian.com/2014/09/14/3313427/courtshould-appoint-a-k-12-special.html.
220
David F. Herr, State Court Rules and Practices Regarding Special Masters,
SL083 ALI-ABA 19, 33 (Nov. 2005).
221
Id. at 25.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 27–31.
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mechanisms when it comes to legislative rebuffs.
3. Public vote
Courts could also take the “hopeful” route: hope that the
media speaks kindly of their decision; hope that public opinion
is on their side; hope that someone puts education funding up
to a vote of the people; and hope that the measure passes. This,
of course, means the court has no power over anything, and the
fate of students is entirely left up to voters. Knowing that these
are the same voters that put hesitant legislators in office to
begin with does not bode well. As in Ohio, even if this route
takes the state up to the point of a referendum, getting the
required number of votes in favor can be a challenge. Again,
tax hikes are not popular items at the ballot box, and the
chronic failure of school levies is often the basis for school
finance litigation anyway.224 Even if all the pieces were to fall
into place, the legislature may fail to appropriate new money to
schools, and simply reallocate the current budget. Further, the
serendipitous occurrence of winning a public vote once will
likely only solve the funding issues for a period of time. With
inflation, the increasing educational competitiveness of other
nations, and the advancing complexity of skills students need
as a baseline for entering the adult world, the baseline for
“adequate funding” will surely change over time.
4. Sanctions
As we have seen, some courts did not turn their backs on
students. They kept fighting, even in the face of opposition, to
protect constitutional rights. In Washington, this meant
holding the legislature in contempt to enforce their ruling.225 In
New Jersey, this meant acting on that contempt and shutting
down schools.226 These sanctions are clearly drastic, last-resort
measures—but when civil rights are continually being violated,
those kinds of measures may be the only way to elicit a
resolution.
Contempt is “conduct that defies the authority or dignity of
a court or legislature. Because such conduct interferes with the
administration of justice, it is punishable, usually by fine or
224
225
226

See sources supra note 212.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.B.
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imprisonment.”227 Contempt is the court’s power to bolster its
authority, and it is an important mechanism by which it can
enforce its orders.228 It originates in the English common law,
but Blackstone writes that it is “as antient [sic] as the laws
themselves.”229 This power of the court, Blackstone wrote,
“must be an inseparable attendant upon every superior
tribunal,” because “laws without a competent authority to
secure their administration from disobedience and contempt,
would be vain and nugatory.”230
Contempt is a valuable tool in a court’s toolbox when it
comes to noncompliance. The effectiveness of contempt orders
for nonpayment of support obligations in family law, for
example, has been analyzed in a number of states.231 A
Michigan study found that contempt was a powerful deterrent
against this nonpayment, with counties that used contempt
incarceration as an enforcement tool increasing their
collections by a greater percentage than counties that did
not.232 A Massachusetts study found that less than 0.3 percent
of cases where contempt was used for nonpayers resulted in jail
time.233 In Oregon, civil contempt resulted in a two hundred
percent increase in collections.234 Oklahoma and Minnesota
reported that contempt, while a last resort, is highly effective
in extracting child support from nonpayers.235 The threat of jail
time often means contemnors “discover” resources to pay their
obligations.236 But will this work with legislative bodies?
Because of a lack of actual occurrences, no comprehensive
studies have been undertaken, but time will tell as
Washington’s legislature now attempts to purge its contempt.237
Similarly drastic measures worked during New Jersey’s first
227

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 360–61 (9th ed. 2009).
Jennifer Fleischer, In Defense of Civil Contempt Sanctions, 36 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 35, 35 (2002).
229
4 BLACKSTONE 285.
230
Id. at 284–85.
231
Contempt Can Be an Effective Enforcement Tool, THE PUNDIT (Friend of the
Court
Bureau,
Lansing,
Mich.),
Nov.
2011
at
1,
available
at
http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/OfficesPrograms/FOC/Documents/Pundits/2
011%2011%20Pundit.pdf.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2572 (2011).
237
See supra Part III.C.
228
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round of school finance cases.238
Courts are adversarial in nature with respect to the parties
before them, and can even be adversarial when dealing with
other branches of government.239 Courts should use their full
powers to enforce their orders and push uncooperative
legislatures to comply; ordering compliance with the
constitution is, after all, the court’s duty just as much as it is
the legislature’s.240 A noted school finance scholar recommends
vigilance on the part of courts.241 They should not sit idly by as
the other branches ignore their orders. In order to bring
finality to the school finance issues states face, courts should
treat legislatures just like normal individuals who ignore court
orders. The next part will expand on this recommendation and
discuss how courts should address common counter-arguments.
V.

RECOMMENDATION FOR STATE COURTS IN SCHOOL
FUNDING STANDOFFS

Many have aptly wondered: are such drastic measures, like
holding an entire state legislature in contempt, even
constitutional? Beyond the cases discussed, no known instances
of this exact situation exist.242 While state courts have held
individual legislators in contempt,243 an entire branch of state
government has apparently not been thusly sanctioned outside
New Jersey and Washington. Those two courts’ specific
sanctions appear to be unprecedented, as one state’s counsel
argued.244 It even appears to be unprecedented when it comes
to other kinds of cases, not just education finance.
Surely, there are separation of powers and other
238

See supra Part III.B.
Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181
(2005). The judiciary is “adversarial” with other branches all the time; they often order
the legislative or executive branches to take certain actions. This is the whole point of
our system of checks and balances.
240
McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 541 (“[T]his court cannot stand on the
sidelines and hope the State meets its constitutional mandate to amply fund education.
Article IX, section 1 is a mandate, not to a single branch of government, but to the
entire state. We will not abdicate our judicial role.”).
241
James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1223, 1260 (2008).
242
Chasan, supra note 185.
243
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
244
State of Washington’s Reply, McCleary v. State, supra note 186.
239
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constitutional questions inherent in one branch sanctioning
another. Editorial boards across the state in Washington
rebuked the court for this very reason when it threatened to
hold the legislature in contempt.245 The executive branch in
New Jersey also voiced these concerns during its constitutional
row.246 Commentators in both states (often despite lack of legal
training) were sure that such actions were beyond the powers
of a court.247 I submit that it is constitutional.248 I recommend
that courts choose this route when faced with situations similar
to those above. Because this solution lacks any legal precedent,
however, the recommendation will be by way of the closest
comparable situations. The rest of this section looks at the text
of contempt statutes and draws comparisons to the most
similar situations in history, in order to recommend how courts
should go about redressing their own dilemmas. It also
addresses some common counter-arguments that are raised
during these constitutional crises and suggests how courts may
rebut them.
A.

Courts Should Look to State Statutes and Constitutions for
Support
In Washington, contempt of court means intentional
245

Editorial, State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, UNIONBULLETIN (Aug. 29, 2014),http://union-bulletin.com/news/2014/aug/31/state-agsrefresher-separation-powers-welcome/; Editorial, State Supreme Court Should Be
Cautious in McCleary School-Funding Case, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 30, 2014),
http://seattletimes.com/html/editorials/2024422163_mcclearyedit31xml.html;
Tracy
Warner, The Washington Supreme Court is Within Inches of Overstepping Its
Constitutional Powers, WENATCHEE WORLD, Aug. 29, 2014, available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicupload/eclips/2014%2009%2002%20The%20Wa
shington%20Supreme%20Court%20is%20within%20inches%20of%20overstepping%20i
ts%20constitutional%20powers.pdf.
246
Marra, supra note 29, at 789–90 (“The Abbott XXI decision has drawn the
attention of many critics, the most vocal of which has arguably been New Jersey
Governor Chris Christie. The Governor, intent on reworking the educational structure
of New Jersey on every level, wishes to establish that the power to make decisions
regarding appropriations lies solely in the hands of the executive and legislative
branches of the state government.”).
247
See State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, supra note 245.
248
REBELL, supra note 33, at 92; Phil Talmadge, Legal Analysis: Constitutional
Implications of Washington Supreme Court’s Remedy in McCleary vs. State, WASH.
POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 2014), http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/brief/legalanalysis-constitutional-implications-washington-supreme-courts-remedy-mccle. Contra
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential But Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in Prison
Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 314 (2008) (“[A court] cannot realistically—and
probably not legally—hold the members of the legislature in contempt of court for
failing to provide adequate funding.”).
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“disobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order, or process
of the court.”249 The New Jersey contempt statute says that
courts have the power to punish for contempt in cases of
“[d]isobedience or resistance . . . by any party . . . or any person
whatsoever to any lawful writ, process, judgment, order or
command of the court.”250 Ohio punishes a person for contempt
if he or she is guilty of “[d]isobedience of, or resistance to, a
lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a
court or officer.”251
Courts should use contempt statutes like these as a basis
for the legislature’s contempt.252 Many of these statutes in some
way mention that the sanctions may apply to “people” or
“persons.”253 A legislature likely falls within the meaning of
“people,” though none of the cited contempt statutes have a
definition section that would aid in answering that question
outright.254 Surely, a “legislature” is comprised of people by the
ordinary definition of the word. Single legislators have been
held in contempt.255 So, what would stop a court from
sanctioning an entire group of them? Further, if legislators are
representatives of the people, and courts may hold ordinary
people in contempt, why not the legislature? If it is because
legislatures are an entity of people, and not an individual, that
is unpersuasive as well. Companies can be held in contempt.256
On the face of the statutes, it would seem that legislators, or a
group of them, could likely be subject to the contempt laws.
As one court observed, “[t]he ultimate power to interpret,
construe and enforce the constitution of this State belongs to
the judiciary . . . . [T]he courts have ample power, and will go to
any length within the limits of judicial procedure, to protect
such constitutional guaranties.”257 If a certain degree of
249

WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.010(1)(b) (2015).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10–1 (West 2015).
251
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.02(A) (West 2015).
252
Missouri, however, has expressly prohibited courts from using their contempt
power to enforce civil rights. MO. ANN. STAT. § 476.150 (West 2015).
253
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.010 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10 (West 2015);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705 (West 2015).
254
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.010 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10 (West 2015);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705 (West 2015).
255
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
256
Zack Whittaker, Microsoft Refuses to Hand Over Foreign Data, Held in
Contempt of Court, ZDNET (Sep. 10, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoftrefuses-to-hand-over-foreign-data-held-in-contempt-of-court/.
257
Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 496, 501 (1978) (quoting
250
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education funding is guaranteed in a state constitution (as it is
in every state), it is then a positive constitutional right, instead
of a negative one. Therefore, the court’s analysis should be
different than the typical rational basis test.258 This is not an
arena in which the court is concerned with whether the state
has done too much. Rather, it must consider whether the state
has done enough.259 Positive constitutional rights require courts
to ask if the state action or inaction achieves, or is reasonably
likely to achieve, the desired ends.260 If the answer is “no,” then
the court has the responsibility, not just the option, to remedy
the situation.261
Legislative immunity should not be persuasive to courts
considering contempt as a solution to the school finance
problem. Washington’s legislature brought this up in its
briefing, stating it would be immune from any contempt order
as per the state constitution’s “speech and debate clause.”262
The federal constitution and forty-three other state
constitutions provide similar protection for their legislators.263
A closer look at the texts show these constitutional guarantees
typically only protect what legislators say in their work from
criminal or civil sanctions. Hence, it protects their words. It
does not protect their actions, especially omissions that violate
a citizen’s civil rights. Many state courts have interpreted this
privilege even more narrowly than the one given to Congress.264
As some have argued since the Civil Rights Era, “the judicial
power necessary to enforce court orders and command respect
overrides the policy supporting the immunity doctrine.”265
Further, as will be revealed below, the privilege usually
extends only to individual members of the legislative body, not
Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 493 (1915).
258
See McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d at 519; Recent Case, Colorado Supreme
Court Upholds State’s School Finance System as Rationally Related to the “Thorough
and Uniform” Mandate of the Colorado Constitution’s Education Clause, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 803, 807 (2013).
259
173 Wash. 2d at 519.
260
Id.
261
REBELL, supra note 33, at 48.
262
State of Washington’s Opening Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause,
McCleary v. State, supra note 187.
263
Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State
Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 224 (2003).
264
Id.
265
Legal Sanctions to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools: The Contempt
Power and the Civil Rights Act, 65 YALE L.J. 630, 641 (1956).
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to the body as whole, which is typically the party to an
education finance action.266 Therefore, courts can likely impose
sanctions against the entire legislative body if necessary to
protect students’ civil right to an adequately funded education.
B.

Courts Should Look to Federal Contempt Proceedings
Against the President for Precedential Value

Court attempts to enforce their rulings against co-equal
branches of government bring to mind Worcester v. Georgia.267
In that 1832 case, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Georgia
laws that expanded the state’s jurisdiction over the Cherokee
nation.268 The laws were part of an attempt to remove the
Native Americans from the state.269 Chief Justice John
Marshall held that Native American nations were independent,
sovereign states.270 Although they were under the United
States’ protection, he wrote, “[p]rotection does not imply the
destruction of the protected.”271
Georgia ignored this ruling, however, and continued its
campaign to remove the Cherokees.272 President Andrew
Jackson also ignored the ruling and allowed Georgia to proceed
with removal.273 Moreover, President Jackson actually asked
the Cherokees to leave the state or submit to Georgia’s rule.274
In response to the Supreme Court opinion, President Jackson
purportedly said, “John Marshall has made his decision. Now
let him enforce it.”275 Unfortunately, the Justice did not.276 This
ultimately led to the Trail of Tears, an incident in which the
federal government forced the Cherokees from their territory

266

See Part V. See also Huefner, supra note 263, at 262.
31 U.S. 515 (1832).
268
Id. at 595 (1832) (“The act of the State of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in
error was prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.”).
269
Tim Alan Garrison, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Oct.
1,
2014),
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/
worcester-v-georgia-1832 (“In the 1820s and 1830s Georgia conducted a relentless
campaign to remove the Cherokees . . . An infuriated Georgia legislature responded by
purporting to extend its jurisdiction over the Cherokees . . . .”).
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31 U.S. at 561.
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Id. at 518.
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Garrison, supra note 269.
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Id.
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and relocated them to Oklahoma.277 So, if the U.S. Supreme
Court had no enforcement power against the President, why
would any state court have similar powers against its own
legislative body?
The courts do have enforcement powers against the
executive branch, although they have only recognized this
ability in recent years. In fact, courts have held the executive
branch in contempt. President Clinton was the first president
held in contempt of court, for willfully giving false testimony
about his romantic relationship with Monica Lewinsky.278 The
federal judge in that case noted that, despite the lack of
precedent for her ruling, no constitutional barrier existed to
imposing sanctions.279 These sanctions included payment of the
plaintiff’s legal fees and reimbursement of court costs.280 The
monetary sanctions are similar to those considered by courts in
the school funding context.281
A federal court also found President Obama’s
administration in contempt in 2011 when the administration
reinstituted a deep water drilling moratorium that a court had
previously invalidated.282 The court then ordered the
government to pay the plaintiff’s legal fees.283 As plaintiff’s
counsel noted, “[t]he government was not at liberty to impose
its own will after the court struck down the policy.”284 “The
government, like any citizen, had to obey the ruling, even if it
didn’t like it,” he continued.285 This is similar to an education
finance situation like the three discussed: one branch of
government continually failed to act according to a co-equal
court’s order, and was consequently sanctioned. State courts
should therefore be confident knowing that their actions have
precedent in this federal context.
277

Id.
John M. Broder & Neil A. Lewis, Clinton is Found to be in Contempt on Jones
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/
04/13/us/clinton-is-found-to-be-in-contempt-on-jones-lawsuit.html.
279
Id. Perhaps ironically, the judge that found President Clinton in contempt
was a former law student of his. Id.
280
Id.
281
See Part III.C.
282
Laurel Calkins, U.S. In Contempt Over Gulf Drill Ban, Judge Rules,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 3, 2011, 12:53 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2011-02-03/u-s-administration-in-contempt-over-gulf-drill-ban-judge-rules.
283
Id.
284
Id.
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Id.
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Courts Should Look to Federal Contempt Proceedings
Against Legislative Officials for Precedential Value

Federal courts have attempted to spearhead reforms much
like those needed for school funding in the prison reform
context.286 In 1972, a Texas inmate filed a handwritten petition
against the Texas Department of Corrections.287 This petition
detailed the constitutional violations that were taking place in
his jail: unlawful solitary confinement, overcrowding,
harassment, and lack of medical care.288 The massive opinion
that resulted, totaling more than one hundred pages,289 was the
basis for “a complete overhaul of the Texas prison system.”290
The case continued for decades as the judge took an active role
in the reform.291
At one point, the judge held the Texas Department of
Corrections in contempt for failing to implement provisions of a
settlement agreement, threatening fines up to twenty-four
million dollars per month.292 The judge who oversaw the case
and issued the contempt citation “incurred the wrath of many”
for his activism, but was “one of four forces which converged to
force legislative action.”293 California recently witnessed a
similar series of prison reform cases.294 The governor and other
state officials were threatened with contempt unless the state
released certain inmates.295 Like students, prisoners are a
voiceless minority needing the staunch protection of courts.
Federal judges, however, have a much easier time taking these
actions than state judges, due to the job security factor.296 This
is likely a reason they have been more comfortable using
286

REBELL, supra note 33, at 4.
Prison Reform: Ruiz v. Estelle, THE WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE PAPERS (2014),
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/exhibits/ww_justice/ruiz_v_estelle.html.
288
Id.
289
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1265–1390 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
290
Prison Reform: Ruiz v. Estelle, supra note 287.
291
Chantale Fiebig, Legislating from the Bench: Judicial Activism in California
and Its Increasing Impact on Adult Prison Reform, 3 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 131, 147
(2007).
292
RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LAW AND SOCIETY READER 271 (1995).
293
FRANK KEMERER, WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 396
(2010).
294
See Fiebig, supra note 291.
295
Paige St. John, Federal Judges Order California to Free 9,600 Inmates, L.A.
TIMES (June 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/20/local/la-me-ff-brownprisons-20130621.
296
U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
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controversial powers to enforce their orders. With this
precedent, though, state courts should take advantage of their
given enforcement mechanisms.
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically endorsed
federal judges holding local governmental bodies in contempt
for noncompliance with an order to enact necessary legislation.
In Spallone v. United States, a district court found the city of
Yonkers, New York, to be purposefully engaging in housing
segregation and enjoined it from continuing the practice.297 The
city council, which had sole legislative power, did not comply.298
The court held the city as a whole, and each individual council
member, in contempt and imposed sanctions.299
The Court of Appeals rejected the contemnors’ legislative
immunity argument, holding that it “does not insulate them
from compliance with a consent judgment . . . which has been
approved by their legislative body.”300 The U.S. Supreme Court
agreed that contempt was proper against the city as a whole,
but not the individual councilmembers, as they had not been
found individually liable in the holding below.301 Therefore,
courts faced with legislative pushback against an education
finance order, would likely be wise to impose sanctions against
the entire legislative body, unless individual representatives
had been a party to the original action.
Another illustrative historical separation of powers struggle
is found in the school desegregation cases during the Civil
Rights Era. Following the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of
Education decisions,302 which mandated desegregation of the
nation’s schools, some state officials vehemently resisted
federal court orders to start implementing their rulings.303 A
prominent example was the “Little Rock Crisis.”304 A federal
court ordered Little Rock Central High School to integrate, but

297

493 U.S. 265, 268 (1990).
Id. at 272.
299
Id.
300
Id. at 273.
301
Id. at 276.
302
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [Brown I]; Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) [Brown II].
303
ANDREW J. DUNAR, AMERICA IN THE FIFTIES 219–20 (2006); Bush v. Orleans
Parish School Board and the Desegregation of New Orleans Schools, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/tu_bush_narrative.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2016).
304
DUNAR, supra note 303, at 219.
298
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Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus disagreed with the ruling.305
To block African-American students from attending, the
governor sent the state National Guard to the school every
day.306 The federal court then held Governor Faubus in
contempt of its ruling.307 This caused the governor to dismiss
the National Guard and allow the children to attend.308 While
President Eisenhower was forced to dispatch federal troops to
quell the citizen mob that ensued afterward,309 the contempt
power was successful in bringing about the court’s decree.
At the time these state officials were fighting against
desegregation, many now-familiar arguments surfaced: judges
were violating separation of powers, and the social problems
were too complex for the judiciary to handle.310 The situation
became much easier for courts to handle with Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, when Congress reserved the right to
withdraw funding from school districts that refused to
desegregate.311 These arguments then became moot.
In the context of school funding, access to an adequate
education is a civil right.312 It is enumerated in every state’s
constitution and guaranteed positively to the children of the
state, just like freedom of speech, religion, and the like. There
is bipartisan support for the statement that “education is the
civil rights issue of our time.”313 Some see the Supreme Court’s
more recent cases, such as Parents Involved in Community

305

Id.
Id.
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
Id. at 220.
310
REBELL, supra note 33, at 9.
311
Id. at 5.
312
See generally, Julio C. Gomez, A Child’s Civil Right to a Thorough and
Efficient Education, 286 N.J. LAW. 65 (2014).
313
Nicole Cobler & Pete Stroud, In Speech, George W. Bush Says Education is
Today’s Most Important Civil Rights Issue, THE DAILY TEXAN (Apr. 17, 2014, 8:51 PM),
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2014/04/10/in-speech-george-w-bush-sayseducation-is-today%E2%80%99s-most-important-civil-rights-issue; Helene Cooper,
Obama Takes Aim at Inequality in Education, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/us/politics/07obama.html?_r=0
(“Describing
education and education equality as the ‘civil rights issue of our time,’ President
Obama called Wednesday for a renewed effort to eliminate the achievement gap
between African-American students and others.”); Kayleigh Skinner, Education Called
Civil
Rights
Issue
of
Today,
CLARION-LEDGER
(June
26,
2014),
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2014/06/26/education-called-civil-rights-issuetoday/11445809/ (“‘Education is the civil rights [issue] of our time,’ McDonald said.”).
306
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Schools v. Seattle School District,314 as an unfortunate retreat
from the strong pro-educational stance it took with Brown and
subsequent rulings.315 State courts have followed the Supreme
Court’s withdrawal in their increasing unwillingness to hear
education finance cases.316 Interestingly, the United States’
ranking in high school graduation rates relative to other
countries has dropped in that time from first to twenty-first.317
It takes a confident judge indeed to hold a legislature in
contempt. That was, however, the exact solution necessary in
the Brown desegregation era. It is equally necessary in the
school finance dilemma the country faces today. Courts should
therefore view this issue as urgently as other civil rights
violations and use their contempt powers to halt them.
D.

Common Critiques and How Courts May Rebut Them

Of course, the issue with comparing the instant case to the
precedent described in the above sections is that none involve
the exact separation of powers issue: a disagreement between
co-equal branches of state government. They are all
approximations. The federal government operates under its
unique set of laws, so a federal court sanctioning federal
executive officials does not provide an exact roadmap.
Likewise, a federal court sanctioning local officials implicates
the unequal federalist power structure. There is simply no
precedent to make this an easy case. With the above reasons
and arguments in mind, however, I urge state courts to use
their full power to hold recalcitrant legislatures in contempt,
and impose sanctions pursuant to that holding, for failing to
comply with their constitutional duties.
Critics of this position argue that allocating more money
toward the school funding problem will not actually solve
anything. Instead, critics say, schools need to learn to use the
money they are given more wisely and frugally.318 Courts have
no need, therefore, to get involved—let alone to sanction a
legislature that they believe rightfully ignored the decree. As
314

551 U.S. 701 (2007).
REBELL, supra note 33, at 2.
316
Id. at 3.
317
Id. at 43.
318
Justin Owen et al., Education Funds Not Being Spent Wisely, THE BEACON
CTR. OF TENN. (Sep. 4, 2013, 9:24 AM), http://www.beacontn.org/2013/09/educationfunds-not-being-spent-wisely/.
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one court concluded, though, “[i]t is nothing more than an
illusion to believe that the extensive disparity in financial
resources does not relate directly to the quality of education.”319
It is hard to imagine that the almost medieval state of Ohio
schools in the 1990s, discussed above, could not have been
brought to at least some minimum health and safety standards
with money for a functioning heating system or fire alarms.
One study found that “[i]nadequate education also dramatically
raises crime rates and health costs, denies the nation
substantial tax revenues, and raises serious questions about
the civic competence of the next generation to function
productively in a complex democratic society.”320 Courts can
easily counter such monetary objections with the knowledge
that this investment will yield greater monetary and societal
returns.
Another critique that surfaces frequently is a more populist
separation of powers concern. A common sentiment is that only
the voters and elected officials can exercise their voice to make
education finance decisions.321 This could be because courts do
not have sufficient resources to make proper decisions in this
area, or because such decisions would be “judicial activism”
taken too far. State judges are often elected too,322 however, so
the importance of having a representative of the people to
make decisions is already fulfilled. Further, courts are
supposed to protect the rights of the minority, even if that is
not a popular decision.323 The right to a certain level of basic
education is specifically laid out in every state’s constitution.324
The implications of restricting courts from enforcing their
orders when dealing with a co-equal branch of government
could be grim for voiceless minorities. As plaintiffs’ counsel in
McCleary queried the court, “[w]hat is the purpose of
separation of powers? Is it to protect government officials who
violate the constitutional rights of citizens?”325
319

Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980).
REBELL, supra note 33, at 6.
321
See State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, supra note 245.
322
Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authchec
kdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (“[A] total of 38 states have some type of judicial
elections.”).
323
Sandlow, supra note 216, at 1164.
324
Dayton & Dupre, supra note 46, at 2356 n.13.
325
Washington State Supreme Court, Oral Arguments: McCleary, et al. v. State
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A related argument states that courts do not have the
“power of the purse.”326 That power belongs to the legislature.
Courts attempting to rule on education finance issues, and
moreover enforce them, are overstepping that boundary.
Admittedly, some courts have overreached.327 Multiple courts,
however, have successfully refrained from telling the
legislature how much money to spend.328 They left that up to
the legislature, and let the representatives define the
parameters by which it should be bound.329 In sum, the court
simply tells the legislature that they are violating the
constitution using boundaries the legislature set for itself.330
Therefore, it is possible to stay within the proper bounds of
judicial oversight and still enforce an order.
E.

Summary of Lessons Learned

Based on the trials and successes of our exemplary
education finance cases, and the analogous contempt
proceedings throughout history, a few practical points can be
gleaned. First, courts should not back down when
constitutional violations of the state education clause are
found. This likely means retaining jurisdiction of the case to
ensure the order is followed. Second, courts must allow the
legislature to define specific formulas and monetary amounts.
Doing otherwise would mean overreaching into legislative
functions. Allowing the party in violation to set their own rules
also ensures less resistance when compliance is mandated.
Third, courts should not afford legislatures too many
chances. This was exemplified in the New Jersey saga.331
Ordering a party to show cause, backed by the specter of
contempt sanctions or school shutdown, may be more effective
in the second or third rehearing than waiting until the seventh
or eighth. The court will lose a lot of its perceived power so late
in the case. Finally, a court must take into account the larger
issues that may result from whatever sanctions it decides to
of
Washington,
TVW.ORG,
at
36:00
(Sep.
3,
2014),
http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2014090001.
326
See State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, supra note 245.
327
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328
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impose. Shutting down schools in the middle of summer, as
New Jersey did, may have little actual impact on students.
Likewise, holding the legislature in contempt may be a
sufficient scare tactic, with little actual negative impacts on the
rest of society, to solve the problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
The stories related above are those of conflicts that have
happened time and time again. These separation of powers
scuffles between branches of government are not new. From
the Trail of Tears to the Little Rock Crisis, governing
counterparts have tried to map out the boundaries of their
constitutional duties and roles. While this battle has been seen
throughout different legal areas, school finance litigation is one
such area that seems to be caught in a never-ending cycle.
Even if plaintiffs in these cases manage to win, a lack of
legislative compliance with judicial orders is a significant
roadblock to the desired outcomes. Courts’ deference to, or
exhaustion with, this legislative inaction means that even
novel litigation approaches or legal theories from the parties
themselves have proven useless. The government must do its
job to implement the remedies. That responsibility falls not
only on the legislative and executive branches, but on the
judicial branch as well.
When presented with this issue, courts should not walk
away from school finance cases. Courts have it within their
power to enforce their orders and bring about finality to the
dispute. That is a choice they must make, however. If “last
resort” remedies are required, they should uphold students’
right to an adequate education under their state constitutions.
Children are remarkably resilient in the face of adversity, but
ensuring a safe, quality learning environment is paramount to
developing an informed citizenry that can contribute to the
world in which we all must live. As a noted education finance
scholar said, “[t]here is broad consensus among business
leaders, government officials, and educators that achieving
both excellence and equity in this manner is critical to the
nation’s future.”332 The time has come for state courts to join in
332

REBELL, supra note 33, at 5.
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that consensus.
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